an alliance with Sertorius. Also see Plutarch, *Life of Lucullus* (7).

2. Mithridates had made him king of the Bosporus. At the news of his father's arrival, he killed himself.


4. See Plutarch, in the *Life of Pompey* (39), and Zonaras, II (X, 5).

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CHAPTER VIII

THE DISSENSIONS THAT ALWAYS EXISTED IN THE CITY

While Rome conquered the world, a secret war was going on within its walls. Its fires were like those of volcanoes which burst forth whenever some matter comes along to increase their activity.

After the expulsion of the kings, the government had become aristocratic. The patrician families alone obtained all the magistracies, all the dignities, and consequently all military and civil honors.

To prevent the return of the kings, the patricians sought to intensify the feelings existing in the minds of the people. But they did more than they intended: by imbuing the people with hatred for kings, they gave them an immoderate desire for liberty. Since royal authority had passed entirely into the hands of the consuls, the people felt they lacked the liberty they were being asked to love. They therefore sought to reduce the consulate, to get plebeian magistrates, and to share the curule magistracies with the nobles. The patricians were forced to grant everything they demanded, for in a city where poverty was public virtue, and where riches—the secret road

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*Curlule magistracies: those conferring the right of using the *sella curulis* or chair of state—namely, those of the dictator, consuls, praetors, censors, and curule aediles.*
to the acquisition of power—were scorned, birth and dignities could not confer great advantages. Thus, power had to return to the greatest number, and gradually the aristocracy had to change into a popular state.

Those who obey a king are less tormented by envy and jealousy than those who live under an hereditary aristocracy. The prince is so distant from his subjects that he is almost unseen by them. And he is so far above them that they can conceive of no relationship on his part capable of shocking them. But the nobles who govern are visible to all, and are not so elevated that odious comparisons are not constantly made. Therefore it has at all times been seen, and is still seen, that the people detest senators. Those republics where birth confers no part in the government are in this respect the most fortunate, for the people are less likely to envy an authority they give to whomever they wish and take back whenever they fancy.

Discontented with the patricians, the people withdrew to Mons Sacer. Deputies were sent to appease them, and since they all promised to help each other in case the patricians did not keep their pledge—which would have caused constant seditions and disturbed all the operations of the magistrates—it was judged better to create a magistracy that could prevent injustices from being done to plebeians. But, due to a malady eternal in man, the plebeians, who had obtained tribunes to defend themselves, used them for attacking. Little by little they removed the prerogatives of the patricians—which produced continual contention. The people were supported, or rather, animated by their tribunes; and the patricians were defended by the senate, which was almost completely composed of them, was more inclined to the old maxims, and

Mons Sacer: a low range of hills about three miles from Rome, consecrated by the people to Jupiter after their secession.
took the census of the people, and, what is more, since the
strength of the republic consisted in discipline, austerity of
morals, and the constant observance of certain customs, they
corrected the abuses that the law had not foreseen, or that
the ordinary magistrate could not punish. There are bad
examples which are worse than crimes, and more states have
perished by the violation of their moral customs than by the
violation of their laws. In Rome, everything that could intro­
duce dangerous novelties, change the heart or mind of the
citizen, and deprive the state—if I dare use the term—of
perpetuity, all disorders, domestic or public, were reformed
by the censors. They could evict from the senate whomever
they wished, strip a knight of the horse the public maintained
for him, and put a citizen in another tribe and even among
those who supported the burdens of the city without partici­
pating in its privileges.

M. Livius stigmatized the people itself, and, of the thirty­
five tribes, he placed thirty-four in the ranks of those who had
no part in the privileges of the city. "For," he said, "after
condemning me you made me consul and censor. You must
therefore have betrayed your trust either once, by inflicting a
penalty on me, or twice, by making me consul and then
censor." M. Duronius, a tribune of the people, was driven from
the senate by the censors because, during his magistracy, he
had abrogated the law limiting expenses at banquets.

The censorship was a very wise institution. The censors
could not take a magistracy from anyone, because that would
have disturbed the exercise of public power, but they
imposed the loss of order and rank, and deprived a citizen,
so to speak, of his personal worth.

Servius Tullius had created the famous division by cen­
turies, as Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus have so
well explained to us. He had distributed one hundred and
ninety-three centuries into six classes, and put the whole of
the common people into the last century, which alor
the sixth class. One sees that this disposition exclu­
common people from the suffrage, not by right but
Later it was ruled that the division by tribes followed in voting, except in certain cases. There were
ty tribes, each with a voice—four in the city and one in the countryside. The leading citizens, all farmers,
to the tribes of the countryside. Those of received the common people, which, enclosed the very little influence on affairs, and this was regard.

salvation of the republic. And when Fabius relocated
the four city tribes the lower classes whom Appius
had spread among all the tribes, he acquired the of Very Great. Every five years the censors took
the actual situation of the republic, and distributed t
among the different tribes in such a manner that the
and the ambitious could not gain control of the vote
the people themselves could not abuse their power.

The government of Rome was admirable. From
abuses of power could always be corrected by its cor
whether by means of the spirit of the people, the st
the senate, or the authority of certain magistrates.

Carthage perished because it could not even er
hand of its own Hannibal when abuses had to b
Athens fell because its errors seemed so sweet to
did not wish to recover from them. And, among
republics of Italy, which boast of the perpetuity
government, ought only to boast of the perpetuity
abuses. Thus, they have no more liberty than Rom
time of the decemvirs.

The government of England is wiser, because

\footnote{a In Latin, Maximus.}
\footnote{d For Montesquieu's analysis of the English Parliament, The Spirit of the Laws, XI, 6.}
there continually examines it and continually examines itself. And such are its errors that they never last long and are often useful for the spirit of watchfulness they give the nation. In a word, a free government—that is, a government constantly subject to agitation—cannot last if it is not capable of being corrected by its own laws.

NOTES

1. The patricians even had something of a sacred quality: they alone could take the auspices. See Appius Claudius' harangue in Livy, VI (40, 41).
2. For example, they alone could have a triumph, since only they could be consuls and command the armies.
4. Origin of the tribunes of the people.
5. Loving glory and composed of men who had spent their lives at war, the people could not refuse their votes to a great man under whom they had fought. They obtained the right to elect plebeians, and elected patricians. They were forced to tie their own hands in establishing the rule that there would always be one plebeian consul. Thus, the plebeian families which first held office were then continually returned to it, and when the people elevated to honors some nobody like Varro or Marius, it was a kind of victory they won over themselves.
6. To defend themselves, the patricians were in the habit of creating a dictator—which succeeded admirably well for them. But once the plebeians had obtained the power of being elected consuls, they could also be elected dictators—which disconcerted the patricians. See in Livy, VIII (12), how Publius Philo reduced them during his dictatorship; he made three laws which were very prejudicial to them.
7. The patricians retained only some sacerdotal offices and the right to create a magistrate called interrex.
8. Like Saturninus and Glaucia.
9. We can see how they degraded those who had favored abandoning Italy after the battle of Cannae, those who had surrendered to Hannibal, and those who—by a mischievous interpretation—had broken their word to him. (Livy, XXIV, 18).
10. This was called: Aerarium aliquem facere, aut in Caeritum tabulas referre (to make someone a citizen of the lowest class, or to place him on the list of the [voteless] inhabitants of Caere). He was expelled from his century and no longer had the right to vote.
11. Livy, XXIX (37).
12. Valerius Maximus, II (9).
13. The dignity of senator was not a magistracy.
15. IV, art. 15 ff.
16. Called turba forensis (the rabble of the forum).
17. See Livy, IX (46).
18. Nor even more power.
CHAPTER IX

TWO CAUSES OF ROME'S RUIN

When the domination of Rome was limited to Italy, the republic could easily maintain itself. A soldier was equally a citizen. Every consul raised an army, and other citizens went to war in their turn under his successor. Since the number of troops was not excessive, care was taken to admit into the militia only people who had enough property to have an interest in preserving the city. Finally, the senate was able to observe the conduct of the generals and removed any thought they might have of violating their duty.

But when the legions crossed the Alps and the sea, the warriors, who had to be left in the countries they were subjugating for the duration of several campaigns, gradually lost their citizen spirit. And the generals, who disposed of armies and kingdoms, sensed their own strength and could obey no longer.

The soldiers then began to recognize no one but their general, to base all their hopes on him, and to feel more remote from the city. They were no longer the soldiers of the republic but those of Sulla, Marius, Pompey, and Caesar. Rome could no longer know if the man at the head of an army in a province was its general or its enemy.

As long as the people of Rome were corrupted only by their tribunes, to whom they could grant only their own power, the senate could easily defend itself because it acted with constancy, whereas the populace always went from
extreme ardor to extreme weakness. But, when the people could give their favorites a formidable authority abroad, all the wisdom of the senate became useless, and the republic was lost.

What makes free states last a shorter time than others is that both the misfortunes and the successes they encounter almost always cause them to lose their freedom. In a state where the people are held in subjection, however, successes and misfortunes alike confirm their servitude. A wise republic should hazard nothing that exposes it to either good or bad fortune. The only good to which it should aspire is the perpetuation of its condition.

If the greatness of the empire ruined the republic, the greatness of the city ruined it no less.

Rome had subjugated the whole world with the help of the peoples of Italy, to whom it had at different times given various privileges. At first most of these peoples did not care very much about the right of Roman citizenship, and some preferred to keep their customs. But when this right meant universal sovereignty, and a man was nothing in the world if he was not a Roman citizen and everything if he was, the peoples of Italy resolved to perish or become Romans. Unable to succeed by their intrigues and entreaties, they took the path of arms. They revolted all along the coast of the Ionian sea; the other allies started to follow them. Forced to fight against those who were, so to speak, the hands with which it enslaved the world, Rome was lost. It was going to be reduced to its walls; it therefore accorded the coveted right of citizenship to the allies who had not yet ceased being loyal, and gradually to all.

After this, Rome was no longer a city whose people had but a single spirit, a single love of liberty, a single hatred of tyranny—a city where the jealousy of the senate's power and the prerogatives of the great, always mixed with respect, was only a love of equality. Once the peoples of Italy became its citizens, each city brought to Rome its genius, its particular interests, and its dependence on some great protector. The distracted city no longer formed a complete whole. And since citizens were such only by a kind of fiction, since they no longer had the same magistrates, the same walls, the same gods, the same temples, and the same graves, they no longer saw Rome with the same eyes, no longer had the same love of country, and Roman sentiments were no more.

The ambitious brought entire cities and nations to Rome to disturb the voting or get themselves elected. The assemblies were veritable conspiracies; a band of seditious men was called a comitia. The people's authority, their laws and even the people themselves became chimerical things, and the anarchy was such that it was no longer possible to know whether the people had or had not adopted an ordinance.

We hear in the authors only of the dissensions that ruined Rome, without seeing that these dissensions were necessary to it, that they had always been there and always had to be. It was the greatness of the republic that caused all the trouble and changed popular tumults into civil wars. There had to be dissensions in Rome, for warriors who were so proud, so audacious, so terrible abroad could not be very moderate at home. To ask for men in a free state who are bold in war and timid in peace is to wish the impossible. And, as a general rule, whenever we see everyone tranquil in a state that calls itself a republic, we can be sure that liberty does not exist there.

What is called union in a body politic is a very equivocal thing. The true kind is a union of harmony, whereby all the

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93 " TWO CAUSES OF ROME'S RUIN

a In extent and importance, Latin rights were between Roman and Italian rights.

b These were the assemblies into which the Roman people were organized for electoral purposes.
parts, however opposed they may appear, cooperate for the
general good of society—as dissonances in music cooperate in
producing overall concord. In a state where we seem to see
nothing but commotion there can be union—that is, a har-
mony resulting in happiness, which alone is true peace. It is as
with the parts of the universe, eternally linked together by
the action of some and the reaction of others.

But, in the concord of Asiatic despotism—that is, of all
government which is not moderate—there is always real dis-
sension. The worker, the soldier, the lawyer, the magistrate,
the noble are joined only inasmuch as some oppress the
others without resistance. And, if we see any union there, it
is not citizens who are united but dead bodies buried one
next to the other.

It is true that the laws of Rome became powerless to
govern the republic. But it is a matter of common observa-
tion that good laws, which have made a small republic grow
large, become a burden to it when it is enlarged. For they
were such that their natural effect was to create a great people,
not to govern it.

There is a considerable difference between good laws
and expedient laws—between those that enable a people to
make itself master of others, and those that maintain its
power once it is acquired.

There exists in the world at this moment a republic that
hardly anyone knows about, and that—in secrecy and silence
—increases its strength every day. Certainly, if it ever attains
the greatness for which its wisdom destinies it, it will neces-
sarily change its laws. And this will not be the work of a
legislator but of corruption itself.

Rome was made for expansion, and its laws were admir-
able for this purpose. Thus, whatever its government had
been—whether the power of kings, aristocracy, or a popular
state—it never ceased undertaking enterprises that made
demands on its conduct, and succeeded in them. It did not
prove wiser than all the other states on earth for a day, but
continually. It sustained meager, moderate and great pros-
perity with the same superiority, and had neither successes
from which it did not profit, nor misfortunes of which it
made no use.

It lost its liberty because it completed the work it wrought
too soon.

NOTES

1. The freedmen, and those called capite censi (because they
had very little property and were only taxed by head) at
first were not enrolled in the army except in pressing cases.
Servius Tullius had put them into the sixth class, and soldiers
were only taken from the first five. But Marius, setting out
against Jugurtha, enrolled everyone indifferently: Milites
scribere non more majorum neque, ex classibus, sed uti
cuiusque libido erat, capite censos plebique (He himself, in
the meantime, proceeded to enlist soldiers not in the old
way, or from the classes, but taking all who were willing
to join him, and most of them from the capite censi). Sallust,
The Jugurthine War, LXXXVI. Notice that in the division
by tribes, those in the four tribes of the city were almost the
same as those who were in the sixth class in the division
by centuries.

2. Latin rights, Italian rights.

3. The Aequians said in their assemblies: "Those able to
choose have preferred their own laws to the law of the city
of Rome, which has been a necessary penalty for those who
could not defend themselves against it." Livy, IX (45).

4. The Asculans, Marsians, Vestinians, Marrucinians, Fer-
tinians, Hirpinians, Pompeianians, Venusinians, Iapygians,
Lucanians, Samnitians and others. Appian, The Civil War,
I (39).

5. The Tuscan, Umbrian, and Latins. This led some peoples
to submit; and, since they too were made citizens, still others
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laid down their arms; and finally there remained only the
Samnites, who were exterminated.

6. Just imagine this monstrous head of the peoples of Italy
which, by the suffrage of every man, directed the rest of the
world.

7. See the Letters of Cicero to Atticus, IV, letter 18.

8. The canton of Bern.

CHAPTER X

THE CORRUPTION OF THE
ROMANS

I believe the sect of Epicurus,* which was introduced at
Rome toward the end of the republic, contributed much
toward tainting the heart and mind of the Romans.† The
Greeks had been infatuated with this sect earlier and thus
were corrupted sooner. Polybius tells us that in his time a
Greek's oaths inspired no confidence, whereas a Roman was,
so to speak, enchained by his.‡

A fact mentioned in the letters of Cicero to Atticus§
shows us the extent to which the Romans had changed in
this regard since the time of Polybius.

"Memmius," he says, "has just communicated to the
senate the agreement his competitor and he had made with
the consuls, by which the latter had pledged to favor them
in their quest for the next year's consulate. And they, on
their part, promised to pay the consuls four hundred thousand

*Epicurus was a Greek philosopher (341-270 B.C.) who
elaborated the doctrine of hedonism in ethics as the proper
complement of atheistic atomism in physics. The greatest Roman
author in this tradition was Lucretius (99-55 B.C.).
sisterces if they furnished three auguries which would declare
terces as they were present when the people had made the law
curiate, although they had not been, and two ex-consuls who
would affirm that they had assisted in signing the senatus
consultum which regulated the condition of their provinces,
although they had not." How many dishonest men in a single
contract!

Aside from the fact that religion is always the best guar­
antee one can have of the morals of men, it was a special
trait of the Romans that they mingled some religious senti­
ment with their love of country. This city, founded under
the best auspices; this Romulus, their king and their god;
this Capitol, eternal like the city, and this city, eternal like
its founder—these, in earlier times, had made an impression
on the mind of the Romans which it would have been desir­
able to preserve.

The greatness of the state caused the greatness of per­
sonal fortunes. But since opulence consists in morals, not
riches, the riches of the Romans, which continued to have
limits, produced a luxury and profusion which did not. Those
who had at first been corrupted by their riches were later
corrupted by their poverty. With possessions beyond the
needs of private life it was difficult to be a good citizen; with
the desires and regrets of one whose great fortune has been
ruined, one was ready for every desperate attempt. And, as
Sallust says, a generation of men arose who could neither have
a patrimony nor endure others having any.

Yet, whatever the corruption of Rome, not every mis­
fortune was introduced there. For the strength of its institu­
tions had been such that it preserved its heroic valor and all
of its application to war in the midst of riches, indolence
and sensual pleasures—which, I believe, has happened to
no other nation in the world.

Roman citizens regarded commerce and the arts as the
occupations of slaves; they did not practice them. If there
were any exceptions, it was only on the part of some freedmen
who continued their original work. But, in general, the
Romans knew only the art of war, which was the sole path
to magistracies and honors. Thus, the martial virtues re­
ained after all the others were lost.

NOTES
1. When Cineas discoursed of it at Pyrrhus' table, Fabricius
wished that Rome's enemies might all adopt the principles
of such a sect. Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus (20).
2. "If you lend a Greek a talent and bind him by ten promises,
ten sureties, and as many witnesses, it is impossible for him
to keep his word. But among the Romans, whether in ac­
counting for public or private funds, people are trustworthy
because of the oath they have taken. The fear of hell has
therefore been wisely established, and it is fought today with­
out reason." Polybius, VI (56).
3. IV, letter 18.
4. The law curiate conferred military power; and the senatus
consultum regulated the troops, money and officers that the
governor was to have. Now for all that to be done at their
fancy, the consuls wanted to fabricate a spurious law and
a spurious senatus consultum.
5. The house Cornelia had bought for seventy-five thousand
drachmas was bought by Lucullus shortly afterwards for two
million five hundred thousand. Plutarch, Life of Marius (18).
6. Ut merito dicatur genitos esse, qui nec ipsi habere possent
res familiares, nec alios pati (So that it was rightly said of
Rome that she begot men who could neither keep property
themselves nor suffer others to do so). Fragment of Sallust's
history, taken from St. Augustine's The City of God, II, 18.
7. Romulus permitted free men only two kinds of occupation
—agriculture and war. Merchants, artisans, those who paid
rent for their house, and tavern-keepers were not numbered among the citizens. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, II (28), IX (25).

8. Cicero gives the reasons for this in his *Offices*, I, 42.
9. It was necessary to have served ten years, between the ages of sixteen and forty-seven. See Polybius, VI (19).

CHAPTER XI

1. SULLA

2. POMPEY AND CAESAR

I beg permission to avert my eyes from the horrors of the wars of Marius and Sulla. Their appalling history is found in Appian. Over and above the jealousy, ambition, and cruelty of the two leaders, every Roman was filled with frenzy. New citizens and old no longer regarded each other as members of the same republic, and they fought a war which—due to its peculiar character—was civil and foreign at the same time.

Sulla enacted laws well-designed to remove the cause of the existing disorders. They increased the authority of the senate, tempered the power of the people, and regulated that of the tribunes. The whim that made him give up the dictatorship seemed to restore life to the republic. But, in the frenzy of his successes, he had done things that made it impossible for Rome to preserve its liberty.

In his Asian expedition he ruined all military discipline. He accustomed his army to rapine, and gave it needs it never had before. He corrupted for the first time the soldiers who were later to corrupt their captains.

He entered Rome arms in hand, and taught Roman generals to violate the asylum of liberty.
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He gave the lands of citizens to the soldiers, and made them forever greedy; from this moment onward, every warrior awaited an occasion that could place in his hands the property of his fellow citizens.

He invented proscriptions, and put a price on the heads of those who were not of his party. After that, it was impossible to adhere to the republic, for with two ambitious men disputing for victory, those who were neutral and partisans only of liberty were sure to be proscribed by whoever won. It was therefore prudent to be an adherent of one or the other.

After him, Cicero tells us, came a man who, in an impious cause, and after a still more shameful victory, not only confiscated the property of individuals but enveloped whole provinces in the same calamity.

In laying down the dictatorship, Sulla had appeared to want only to live under the protection of his own laws. But this action, indicating so much moderation, was itself a consequence of his acts of violence. He had set up forty-seven legions in different places in Italy. "Regarding their fortunes as attached to his life," says Appian, "these men watched over his safety and were always ready to aid or avenge him."

Since the republic necessarily had to perish, it was only a question of how, and by whom, it was to be overthrown.

Two men of equal ambition—except that one did not know how to gain his end as directly as the other—overshadowed all other citizens by their repute, their exploits and their virtues. Pompey was first to appear; Caesar came right after him.

To attract favor to himself, Pompey set aside the laws of Sulla limiting the power of the people. When he had sacrificed the most salutary laws of his country to his ambition, he obtained all he wanted, and the temerity of the people in his behalf knew no bounds.

The laws of Rome had wisely divided public power among a large number of magistracies, which supported, checked and tempered each other. Since they all had only limited power, every citizen was qualified for them, and the people—seeing many persons pass before them one after the other—did not grow accustomed to any in particular. But in these times the system of the republic changed. Through the people the most powerful men gave themselves extraordinary commissions—which destroyed the authority of the people and magistrates, and placed all great matters in the hands of one man, or a few.

Was it necessary to make war on Sertorius? The commission was given to Pompey. On Mithridates? Everyone cried Pompey. Did grain have to be brought to Rome? The people thought themselves lost if Pompey was not appointed. Were the pirates to be destroyed? Only Pompey could do it. And, when Caesar threatened invasion, the senate cried out in its turn and placed its hopes in none but Pompey.

"I really believe," said Marcus to the people "that Pompey—whom the nobles await—will prefer to secure your liberty rather than their domination. But there was a time when each of you had the protection of many, and not all the protection of one, and when it was unheard of that one mortal could give or take away such things."

Since Rome was made for expansion, honors and power had to be united in the same persons, which in times of trouble could fix the admiration of the people on a single citizen.

When one accords honors, one knows precisely what one gives; but when power is joined to them, one cannot say how far it may be stretched.

Excessive preference given to a citizen in a republic always has necessary effects. It either makes the people envious or increases their love beyond measure.

*A man: Caesar.
On two occasions Pompey returned to Rome with the power to crush it, but had the moderation to discharge his armies before entering the city and to appear as a simple citizen. These actions, which covered him with glory, had the effect thereafter of causing the senate always to declare itself for him, whatever he did to the prejudice of the laws.

Pompey had a slower and milder ambition than Caesar. The latter wanted to ascend to sovereign power arms in hand, like Sulla. This way of oppressing did not please Pompey. He aspired to the dictatorship, but through the votes of the people. He could not consent to usurp power, but he would have wanted it placed in his hands.

Since the favor of the people is never constant, there were times when Pompey saw his prestige diminish. And he was really upset when men he scorned increased their prestige and used it against him.

This made him do three equally fatal things. He corrupted the people with money, and in elections put a price on the vote of every citizen.

In addition, he used the vilest mobs to disturb the magistrates in their functions, hoping that sober men, tired of living in anarchy, would make him dictator out of despair.

Finally, he joined forces with Caesar and Crassus. Cato said it was their union, not their enmity, that destroyed the republic. Indeed, Rome was in the unfortunate position of being less burdened by civil wars than by peace, which united the views and interests of the leading men and brought nothing but tyranny.

Pompey did not exactly lend his reputation to Caesar, but, without knowing it, he sacrificed it to him. Soon Caesar employed against Pompey the forces Pompey had given him, and even his artifices. He disturbed the city with his emissaries, and gained control over the elections. Consuls, praetors, and tribunes were bought at the price they themselves set.

The senate, which clearly saw Caesar's designs, had recourse to Pompey. It begged him to undertake the defense of the republic—if this name could be used for a government which implored protection from one of its citizens.

I believe that Pompey was ruined more than anything else by his shame at thinking that he had lacked foresight in elevating Caesar as he did. He yielded as slowly as possible to this idea. He did not prepare his defense so that he would not have to admit he had placed himself in jeopardy. He maintained before the senate that Caesar did not dare make war, and because he said it so often, he always repeated it.

One circumstance seems to have given Caesar the opportunity to undertake anything he wanted. Because of an unfortunate conformity of names, the government of Gaul beyond the Alps had been joined to his government of Gaul.

State policy had not permitted armies close to Rome, but neither had it allowed Italy to be entirely emptied of troops. For this reason, considerable forces were kept in Cisalpine Gaul—that is, in the region going from the Rubicon, a small river in Romagna, to the Alps. But to secure the city of Rome against these troops, the famous senatus consultum which can still be seen engraved on the road from Rimini to Cesena was issued. It consigned to the infernal gods, and declared guilty of sacrilege and parricide, anyone who passed the Rubicon with a legion, an army or a cohort.

To so important a government another still more considerable was joined—that of Transalpine Gaul, consisting of the regions of southern France. This gave Caesar a chance to wage war for several years on all the peoples he wanted. It made his soldiers grow older with him and enabled him to conquer them no less than the barbarians. If Caesar had not had the government of Transalpine Gaul, he would not have corrupted his soldiers, nor made his name respected by so many victories. If he had not had that of Cisalpine Gaul,
Pompey could have stopped him at the Alpine pass. As it turned out, Pompey had to abandon Italy at the outset of the war, thus losing for his party the prestige which, in civil wars, is power itself.

The same fright that Hannibal awakened in Rome after the battle of Cannae was spread by Caesar when he crossed the Rubicon. Pompey was distraught and, in the early moments of the war, saw no alternative but the one resorted to last in desperate situations. He could only yield and fly; he departed from Rome, leaving the public treasury behind; nowhere could he delay the victor; he abandoned part of his troops, all of Italy, and crossed the sea.

Much is said of Caesar's good fortune. But this extraordinary man had so many great qualities, without a single defect—although he had many vices—that it would have been very difficult for him not to have been victorious, whatever army he commanded, and not to have governed any republic in which he was born.

After defeating Pompey's lieutenants in Spain, Caesar went to Greece seeking Pompey himself. Pompey, in possession of the sea coast and superior forces, was on the verge of seeing Caesar's army perish from misery and famine. But since his supreme weakness was wanting the approval of others, he could not refrain from lending an ear to the vain talk of his men, who railed at him or reproached him endlessly. He wishes,” said one, “to perpetuate himself in command and be the king of kings, like Agamemnon.” “I warn you,” said another, “that we shall not eat the figs of Tusculum again this year.” Some particular successes he had finally turned the head of this senatorial group. Thus, in order to escape censure, Pompey did something posterity will always censure, and sacrificed so many advantages to engage in battle with new troops against an army that had been victorious so often.

When the survivors of Pharsalus had withdrawn to Africa, Scipio, who commanded them, was never willing to follow Cato's advice and protract the war. Made overconfident by certain advantages, he risked all and lost all. And when Brutus and Cassius reestablished this party, the same precipitation lost the republic a third time.11

You will notice that during these civil wars, which lasted so long, Rome’s external power kept growing steadily. Under Marius, Sulla, Pompey, Caesar, Anthony, and Augustus, Rome constantly became more terrifying and completed the destruction of all the remaining kings.

No state threatens others with conquest like one in the throes of civil war. Everyone—noble, burgher, artisan, farmer—becomes a soldier, and when peace unites the opposing forces, this state has great advantages over those with nothing but citizens. Besides, during civil wars great men are often produced, because in the confusion those with merit come to the fore. Each man finds his own place and rank, whereas at other times each is given his place, and almost always wrongly. And, to go from the example of the Romans to others that are more recent, the French were never more to be feared abroad than after the quarrels of the houses of Burgundy and Orleans, after the commotions of the League, and after the civil wars during the minorities of Louis XIII and Louis XIV. England was never so respected as under Cromwell, after the wars of the Long Parliament. The Germans acquired superiority over the Turks only after the civil wars of Germany. The Spanish, under Philip V, immediately after the civil wars for the succession, showed a strength in Sicily that amazed Europe. And today we see Persia reborn from the ashes of civil war and humbling the Turks.

Finally, the republic was crushed. And we must not blame it on the ambition of certain individuals; we must blame it on man—a being whose greed for power keeps
increasing the more he has of it, and who desires all only because he already possesses much.

If Caesar and Pompey had thought like Cato, others would have thought like Caesar and Pompey; and the republic, destined to perish, would have been dragged to the precipice by another hand.

Caesar pardoned everyone, but it seems to me that moderation shown after usurping everything does not deserve great praise.

In spite of what has been said of Caesar's diligence after Pharsalus, Cicero rightly charges him with procrastination. He tells Cassius that they would never have believed Pompey's party would make such a comeback in Spain and Africa, and that, if they could have foreseen Caesar would toy with his Alexandrian war, they would not have made their peace and would have withdrawn to Africa with Scipio and Cato. Thus, a mad love affair made Caesar take on four wars, and, by not foreseeing the last two, he again put into question what had been decided at Pharsalus.

At first Caesar governed under titles of magistracy—for men are hardly moved by anything but names. And just as the peoples of Asia abhorred the names of consul and proconsul, the peoples of Europe detested the name of king—so that, in those days, these names made for the happiness or despair of the whole earth. Caesar did not refrain from trying to have the diadem placed on his head, but, seeing the people stop its acclamations, he rejected it. He made still other attempts; and I cannot comprehend how he could believe that because the Romans endured him as a tyrant, they therefore loved tyranny or believed they had done what they had.

One day when the senate was conferring certain honors upon him, he neglected to rise; and it was then that the gravest members of this body lost all remaining patience.

Men are never more offended than when their ceremonies and practices are flouted. Seeking to oppress them is sometimes a proof of the esteem one has for them; flouting their customs is always a mark of contempt.

At all times an enemy of the senate, Caesar could not conceal the scorn he felt for that body, which had become almost ridiculous since its loss of power. For this reason, his clemency itself was insulting. It was observed that he did not pardon but rather disdained to punish.

He carried scorn to the point where he himself decreed senatus consultum; he signed them with the names of the first senators who came to mind. "I sometimes learn," says Cicero, "that a senatus consultum, passed on my recommendation, has been carried into Syria and Armenia before I knew a thing about it. And several princes have written me letters of thanks for advising that they receive the title of king when I was not only ignorant of their being kings but of their very existence."

From the letters of some great men of this time, attributed to Cicero because most are by him, we can see the dejection and despair of the foremost men of the republic at this sudden revolution depriving them of their honors and even their occupations. When the senate no longer had a function, the respect they had enjoyed everywhere on earth they could only hope to win in the cabinet of one man. And this is much more obvious in these letters than in the treatises of historians. They are the chef d'oeuvre of the naivety of men united by a common affliction, and of an age when false politeness had not spread lying everywhere. In short, we do not see in them men who wish to deceive each other, as in most of our modern letters, but unhappy friends who seek to tell each other everything.

It was quite difficult for Caesar to defend his life. Most of the conspirators were of his own party, or had been heaped with benefits by him. And the reason for this is quite natural: they had found great advantages in his victory, but the more their fortune improved, the more they began to par-
take of the common misfortune.\textsuperscript{17} For to a man who has nothing it makes rather little difference, in certain respects, under what kind of government he lives.

Moreover, there was a certain law of nations\textsuperscript{b}—an opinion held in all the republics of Greece and Italy—according to which the assassin of someone who had usurped sovereign power was regarded as a virtuous man. Especially in Rome, after the expulsion of the kings, the law was precise, and its precedents established. The republic put arms in the hand of every citizen, made him a magistrate for the moment, and recognized him as its defender.

Brutus\textsuperscript{18} even dares tell his friends that if his own father returned to earth, he would kill him just the same.\textsuperscript{c} And although the continuation of the tyranny gradually brought about the disappearance of this spirit of liberty, conspiracies were constantly reviving at the beginning of Augustus' reign.

It was an overpowering love of country which—taking leave of the ordinary rules for crimes and virtues—hearkened

\textsuperscript{b}The term law of nations referred either to primarily unwritten rules of justice regulating the relations among nations (i.e., to international law, as at the beginning of chapter 1 above) or to laws (written and unwritten) common to all or most nations, as in the present instance. But Montesquieu applies it to a belief about tyrannicide confined to the republics of Greece and Italy of that day. Compare Chapter XV, par. 4, where it is used even more narrowly. See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, first part of the second part, Q 95, art. 4; Grotius Of the Law of War and Peace, I, 1 (14); Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, I, 3.

\textsuperscript{c}This sentence makes little obvious sense, because Montesquieu has omitted the part where Brutus says that he would not concede even to his own father (were he to return to earth) the things he would not endure in Caesar. See Cicero’s Letters edited by Shuckburgh (London, 1909), vol. 4, p. 245.

only to itself and saw neither citizen, friend, benefactor, nor father. Virtue seemed to forget itself in order to surpass itself, and it made men admire as divine an action that at first could not be approved because it was atrocious.

Indeed, was it not impossible to punish the crime of Caesar, who lived under a free government, in any other way than by assassination? And was not asking why he had not been proceeded against by open force or by the laws the same as asking that his crimes be punished?

NOTES

1. So that he himself rather than Sulla would receive the commission for the war against Mithridates, Marius, with the help of the tribune, Sulpius, had spread the eight new tribes of the peoples of Italy among the old tribes. This gave the Italians control over the voting, and they, for the most part, were in Marius’ party, while the senate and the old citizens were in Sulla’s.

2. See the portrait of this army given us by Sallust in The Conspiracy of Catiline (11, 12).

3. Fugatis Marii copis, primus urbem Romam cum armis ingressus est (The troops of Marius having fled, he was the first to enter the city of Rome with arms). Fragment of John of Antioch, in The Extract of Virtues and Vices.

4. In the beginning, part of the lands of the conquered enemy was indeed distributed; but Sulla gave out the lands of citizens.

5. Offices, II, 8.

6. We can see what happened after Caesar’s death.

7. Plebis opes imminutae, paucorum potentia crevit (The power of the people was reduced, and the authority of the few increased). Sallust, The Conspiracy of Catiline (39).

8. Fragment of Sallust’s History.

9. See Plutarch.

10. See Plutarch, Life of Pompey.
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11. This is well explained in Appian, *The Civil War*, IV (108 ff).
13. He dismissed the tribunes of the people.
15. See the letters of Cicero and Servius Sulpicius.
17. I do not speak of a tyrant's satellites, who would share his ruin, but of his companions in a free government.

CHAPTER XII

THE CONDITION OF ROME

AFTER CAESAR'S DEATH

So impossible was it for the republic to be reestablished that something entirely unprecedented happened: the tyrant was no more, but there was no liberty either. For the causes that had destroyed the republic still remained.

The conspirators had only made plans for the conspiracy, not for following it up.

After the deed was done, they withdrew to the Capitol. The senate did not meet, and the next day, Lepidus, who was looking for trouble, seized the Roman forum with armed men.

The veteran soldiers, who feared the immense gifts they had received would not be repeated, entered Rome. This made the senate give approval to all Caesar's acts, and, for the purpose of conciliating the extremes, grant an amnesty to the conspirators—which produced a counterfeit peace.

Before his death, in preparation for his expedition against the Parthians, Caesar had appointed magistrates for several years, so that his own men might maintain the tranquillity of his government while he was gone. Thus, after his death, his partisans enjoyed resources for a long time.

Since the senate had approved all Caesar's acts without
restriction, and since their execution was delegated to the consuls, Antony, who was a consul, seized his ledgers, won over his secretary, and had inscribed in the ledgers whatever he wanted. In this way the dictator reigned more imperiously than during his lifetime, for Antony did what Caesar would never have done. The money he would never have distributed was distributed by Antony, and every man who bore a grudge against the republic suddenly found a reward in Caesar's ledgers.

As a further misfortune, Caesar had amassed immense sums for his expedition and stored them in the temple of Ops, Antony, with his ledger, disposed of them as he wished.

The conspirators had resolved to throw Caesar's body into the Tiber. They would have met with no obstacle, for in the moments of shock which follow an unexpected action, it is easy to do whatever one dares. But it was not done, and this is what happened.

The senate thought itself obliged to permit Caesar's obsequies, and indeed, since it had not declared him a tyrant, it could not refuse him burial. Now it was a Roman custom, highly praised by Polybius, to carry images of their ancestors in funerals and then deliver a funeral oration for the deceased. Antony, as the orator, showed the people Caesar's bloody robe, read them his will, in which he bestowed great bounties upon them, and stirred them to such a pitch that they set fire to the conspirators' houses.

We have an admission from Cicero, who governed the senate during the whole affair, that it would have been better to act with vigor and risk death, and that no one would have died either. But he exculpates himself by claiming that by the time the senate was assembled, it was too late. And anyone who knows the importance of a moment in affairs in which the people have so large a part will not be surprised at this.

And another accident was involved. While games were in progress honoring Caesar, a comet with a long tail appeared for seven days. The people believed his soul had been admitted into heaven.

It was indeed customary among the peoples of Greece and Asia to build temples to the kings and even the proconsuls who had governed them. They were permitted to do these things as the strongest evidence they could give of their servitude. Even the Romans could accord divine honors to their ancestors in their lararia or private temples. But I do not see that any Roman, from Romulus to Caesar, had been numbered among the public divinities.

The government of Macedonia had fallen to Antony; he wanted that of the Gauls instead, and it is easy to see why. Decimus Brutus had Cisalpine Gaul and Antony wanted to drive him out because he refused to turn it over to him. This produced a civil war, in which the senate declared Antony an enemy of his country.

Cicero had made the mistake of working to elevate Octavius in order to ruin Anthony, his personal enemy. And instead of trying to make the people forget Caesar, he had put Caesar back before their eyes.

Octavius conducted himself adroitly with Cicero. He flattered him, praised him, consulted him, and employed all the artifices of which vanity is never distrustful.

Almost all ventures are spoiled by the fact that those who undertake them usually seek—in addition to the main objec-

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*a At this point the Pléiade edition includes a footnote, considered as Montesquieu's own, to Suetonius, Juliius, 82.

*b See Polybius, VI, 53.
tive—certain small, personal successes which flatter their
self-love and give them self-satisfaction.

I believe that if Cato had preserved himself for the republic, he would have given a completely different turn to events. Cicero's talents admirably suited him for a secondary role, but he was not fit for the main one. His genius was superb, but his soul was often common. With Cicero, virtue was the accessory, with Cato, glory. Cicero always thought of himself first, Cato always forgot about himself. The latter wanted to save the republic for its own sake, the former in order to boast of it.

I could continue the comparison by saying that when Cato foresaw, Cicero feared, that where Cato hoped, Cicero was confident, that the former always saw things dispassionately, the latter through a hundred petty passions.

Antony was defeated at Mutina, but the two consuls, Hirtius and Pansa, lost their lives there. The senate, believing it had things under control, considered reducing Octavius, who, for his part, stopped working against Antony, led his army to Rome, and had himself declared consul.

This is how Cicero, who boasted that his robe had destroyed Antony's armies, presented the republic with an enemy even more dangerous because his name was more beloved and his rights, in appearance, more legitimate.

After his defeat, Antony took refuge in Transalpine Gaul, where he was received by Lepidus. These two men united with Octavius, and they traded off to each other the lives of their friends and enemies. Lepidus remained in Rome. The other two went looking for Brutus and Cassius, and they found them in those places where mastery of the world was contested three times over.

Brutus and Cassius killed themselves with inexcusable precipitation, and we cannot read this chapter in their lives without pitying the republic which was thus abandoned. Cato had killed himself at the end of the tragedy; these began it, in a sense, by their death.

Several reasons can be given for this practice of committing suicide that was so common among the Romans: the advances of the Stoic sect, which encouraged it; the establishment of triumphs and slavery, which made many great men think they must not survive a defeat; the advantage those accused of some crime gained by bringing death upon themselves, rather than submitting to a judgment whereby their memory would be tarnished and their property confiscated; a kind of point of honor, more reasonable, perhaps, than that which today leads us to slaughter our friend for a gesture or word; finally, a great opportunity for heroism, each man putting an end to the part he played in the world wherever he wished.

We could add to these a great facility in executing the deed. When the soul is completely occupied with the action it is about to perform, with the motive determining it, with the peril it is going to avoid, it does not really see death, for passion makes us feel but never see.

Self-love, the love of our own preservation, is transformed in so many ways, and acts by such contrary principles, that it leads us to sacrifice our being for the love of our being. And such is the value we set on ourselves that we consent and fundamental element of man's nature best described as self-love, of which vanity is but one derivative. It is this latter use that Rousseau chose to distinguish by the name amour de soi, or "love of oneself." See Rousseau's First and Second Discourses, edited by Roger Masters (New York, 1964), pp. 130, 221-2, 236.
to cease living because of a natural and obscure instinct that makes us love ourselves more than our very life.*

NOTES

1. This would not have been without precedent. After Tiberius Gracchus had been killed, Lucretius, an aedile, who there­after was called Vespillo, threw his body into the Tiber. Aurelius Victor, Illustrious Men of Rome (64).
2. Letters to Atticus, XIV, letter 16.
3. See the Letters of Cicero to Atticus, V (21), on this point, and the remark of the Abbé de Montgault.
4. Dio says that the triumvirs, who all hoped to take Caesar's place some day, did everything they could to increase the honors accorded him. XLVII (18, 19).
5. Esse quam videri bonus malebat; itaque quominus glori­am petebat, eo magis illam assequebatur (He preferred to be rather than to appear virtuous; and thus, the less he sought glory, the more it pursued him). Sallust, The Conspiracy of Cataline (54).
6. He was Caesar's heir and his son by adoption.
7. Their cruelty was so irrational that they ordered everyone to rejoice in the proscriptions, on pain of death. See Dio (XLVII, 14).
8. Eorum qui de se statutebant humabantur corpora, manebant testamenta, pretium festinandi (Those who passed sen­tence on themselves were rewarded for their dispatch by being allowed burial and having their wills respected). Tacitus, Annals, VI (29).

* The following passage appeared in the original edition of 1734 but was dropped from the edition of 1748, presumably by Montesquieu himself, only to reappear in the collected works of 1758 recently reprinted by Nagel. It reads: "It is certain that men have become less free, less courageous, less disposed to great enterprises than they were when, by means of this power which one assumed, one could at any moment escape from every other power."

CHAPTER XIII

AUGUSTUS

Sextus Pompey held Sicily and Sardinia. He was master of the sea, and had with him countless fugitives and exiles who were fighting with their last remaining hopes at stake. Octavius waged two quite laborious wars against him, and, after many failures, vanquished him through the skill of Agrippa.

The lives of the conspirators had almost all come to an unhappy end. And it was quite natural that men at the head of a party which was beaten so many times, in wars where no quarter was given, should have died violent deaths. People drew the conclusion, however, that a heavenly vengeance was punishing Caesar's murderers and condemning their cause.

Octavius won over Lepidus' soldiers and stripped him of the power of the triumvirate. He even begrudged him the consolation of leading an obscure life, and forced him to be present, as a private individual, in the popular assemblies.

It is satisfying to see this Lepidus humiliated. He was the most wicked citizen in the republic—always the first to begin disturbances, constantly forming evil projects in which he was forced to associate with cleverer men than himself. A modern author has amused himself by eulogizing him, and cites Antony, who, in one of his letters, calls him a gentleman. But a gentleman for Antony ought hardly to be one for others.

I believe Octavius to be the only one of all the Roman
captains who won his soldiers' affection even while repeatedly giving them signs of his natural cowardice. In those days the soldiers valued the liberality of a general more than his courage. Perhaps it was even lucky for him not to have had the valor that can win dominion, and perhaps this itself helped him win, since people feared him less. It is not impossible that the things which dishonored him most were those that served him best. If from the first he had displayed a great soul, everyone would have distrusted him. And if he had been bold he would not have given Antony the time to engage in all the extravagances that caused his downfall.

Preparing himself against Octavius, Antony swore to his soldiers that he would reestablish the republic two months after his victory. This shows that even the soldiers were anxious for the liberty of their country, although they continually destroyed it—there being nothing so blind as an army.

The battle of Actium took place; Cleopatra fled, carrying Antony away with her. It is certain that she betrayed him afterwards. Perhaps, with a woman's unbelievable spirit of coquetry, she had formed the design of bringing to her feet still a third master of the world.

A woman for whom Antony had sacrificed the whole world betrayed him. So many captains and kings whose power he had extended or established failed him. And, as if generosity had been linked to servitude, a troop of gladiators maintained an heroic fidelity to him. Cover a man with benefits and the first idea you inspire in him is to seek the means of preserving them; they are so many new interests you give him to defend.

A surprising feature of these wars is that a single battle almost always decided the matter, and a single defeat was irreparable.

Roman soldiers did not really have party spirit. They did not fight for a certain thing, but for a certain person; they knew only their leader, who bound them to him by immense hopes. But since a defeated leader was no longer in a position to fulfill his promises, they turned to someone else. The provinces did not enter into the quarrel with any greater interest because it was of little importance to them whether the senate or the people had the upper hand. Thus, no sooner was one of the leaders defeated than they gave themselves to the other; for each city had to think of justifying itself to the victor, who had immense promises to keep to his soldiers and had to sacrifice to them the most culpable communities.

In France we have had two sorts of civil wars. Some had religion as a pretext, and they endured because their motive continued after victory. The others did not really have any motive, but were instigated by the levity or ambition of some powerful men, and were stifled at once.

Augustus (this is the name flattery gave Octavius) established order—that is, a durable servitude. For in a free state in which sovereignty has just been usurped, whatever can establish the unlimited authority of one man is called good order, and whatever can maintain the honest liberty of the subjects is called commotion, dissension, or bad government.

All the men with ambitious projects had labored to inject a kind of anarchy into the republic. Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar succeeded marvelously at this. They established an impunity for all public crimes; they abolished whatever could stop the corruption of morals or make for effective public order. And as good legislators attempt to make their citizens better, so these labored to make them worse. They therefore introduced the practice of corrupting the people with money; and if someone was accused of intrigues, he also corrupted the judges. They disturbed elections with all kinds of violence; and if someone was brought to justice, he intimidated the judges as well. The very authority of the people was destroyed—witness Gabinius, who after reestablishing Ptol-

\* Public order: *police*; see above, Chapter V, footnote b.
enemy by armed might in spite of the people, coldly came to claim a triumph. These foremost men of the republic sought to make the people weary of their own power and to become necessary by exacerbating the inconveniences of republican government. But once Augustus was master, policy required his working to reestablish order so that everyone would experience the blessings of one-man government.

When Augustus was armed for war, he feared the revolts of soldiers and not the conspiracies of citizens; that is why he treated the soldiers with care and was so cruel to others. When he was at peace, he feared conspiracies; and always having Caesar's destiny before his eyes, he meant to follow a different line of conduct in order to avoid the same fate. This is the key to Augustus' whole life. He wore a breastplate under his robe in the senate; he refused the title of dictator. Whereas Caesar insolently stated that the republic was nothing and that his own word was law, Augustus spoke only of the senate's dignity and of his respect for the republic. His intention, therefore, was to establish that government which was most capable of pleasing without damaging his interests; and he made it aristocratic with respect to civil affairs, and monarchical with respect to military affairs. But since it was not supported by its own strength, this ambiguous government could subsist only so long as it pleased the monarch, and consequently was entirely monarchical.

The question has been asked whether Augustus really had planned to resign his power. But who does not see that if he wanted to it was impossible for him not to succeed? The fact that every ten years he asked to be relieved of his burden and yet kept carrying it proves that he was only acting. These were little artifices for the purpose of being granted again what he did not think he had sufficiently acquired. I am being guided by Augustus' whole life; and, although men are extremely queer, it very rarely happens that they renounce in a moment what they have sought throughout their life. All Augustus' actions, all his regulations, tended visibly toward the establishment of monarchy. Sulla relinquished the dictatorship; but in Sulla's whole life, even in the midst of his acts of violence, a republican spirit was revealed. All his regulations, although tyrannically executed, always tended toward a certain form of republic. Sulla, a man of passion, violently led the Romans to liberty; Augustus, a scheming tyrant, conducted them gently to servitude. Under Sulla, while the republic regained its strength, everyone cried out against the tyranny; and while tyranny fortified itself under Augustus, people spoke of nothing but liberty.

The custom of triumphs, which had contributed so much to Rome's greatness, disappeared under Augustus; or, rather, this honor became a privilege of sovereignty. Most of the things that happened under the emperors had their origin in the republic, and it is necessary to make comparisons. Only the man under whose auspices a war was undertaken had the right to claim a triumph; but war was always undertaken under the auspices of the supreme commander and thus of the emperor, who was the supreme commander of all the armies.

In the days of the republic, the principle was to make war continually; under the emperors, the maxim was to maintain peace. Victories were regarded as occasions for worry, involving armies that could set too high a price on their services.

Those in positions of command feared undertaking things that were too great. One's glory had to be kept moderate in order to arouse the attention but not the jealousy of the

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8 Gabinius had remained governor of Syria even after the senate ordered his return to Rome, and he violated the Roman law against making war outside of his own province when he fought Ptolemy's rebellious subjects in Egypt (c. 56 B.C.).
prince and to refrain from appearing before him with a brilliance his eyes could not tolerate.

Augustus was quite cautious in granting the right of Roman citizenship: he made laws to prevent the excessive manumission of slaves. In his will he recommended that these two policies be adhered to, and that no attempt be made to extend the empire by new wars.

These three things were clearly linked together: once there were no more wars, new citizens and manumissions were no longer necessary.

When Rome was continually engaged in war, it had to replenish its inhabitants continually. In the beginning, a segment of the people of each conquered city was led to Rome. Later, many citizens of neighboring cities came there to share in the right of voting, and they established themselves in such large numbers that, on the complaints of the allies, Rome was often forced to send them back. Finally, crowds came flocking in from the provinces. In addition, the laws favored marriages, and even required them. In all its wars, Rome also took a prodigious number of slaves, and when its citizens were loaded with wealth, they bought slaves everywhere. But slaveowners were moved by generosity, avarice and weakness of character to free countless numbers of them, some wanting to recompense faithful slaves, others to receive, in their name, the grain the republic distributed to poor citizens, and still others, finally, to have in their funeral procession many attendants crowned with flowers. Almost all of the people were freedmen, so that these masters of the world not only in the beginning but in every age were mainly of servile origin.

Since the number of common people—almost all freed-

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This was done by the action of censors (in 403 and 151 B.C.) against bachelors, and under Augustus by the law Papia Poppaea. (Juliian).

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AUGUSTUS

men or sons of freedmen—had become inconvenient, they were formed into colonies and in this way helped assure the loyalty of the provinces. This made for a circulation of the men of all nations: Rome received them as slaves and sent them out as Romans.

On the pretext of some rioting at elections, Augustus placed a governor and garrison in the city. He made the legions permanent, stationed them along the frontiers, and established special funds to pay them. Finally, he decreed that veterans should receive compensation in money, not lands.

Many bad effects resulted from the distribution of lands carried on since Sulla's time. The ownership of property by citizens was rendered insecure. If the soldiers of a cohort were not located in the same place, they wearied of their situation, left the lands uncultivated, and became dangerous citizens. But if the lands were distributed by legions, ambitious men could raise armies against the republic at a moment's notice.

Augustus made fixed provisions for the navy. Just as, before him, the Romans had lacked permanent land forces, so too had they lacked permanent sea forces. The main purpose of Augustus' fleets was to provide for the security of convoys and the communication of the various parts of the empire with each other. For otherwise the Romans were masters of the whole Mediterranean, which was the only sea navigated in those times, and they had no enemy to fear.

Dio quite aptly remarks that under the emperors it was more difficult to write history. Everything became secret. All dispatches from the provinces were carried into the emperors' cabinet. Nothing more was known than what the folly and boldness of tyrants did not wish to conceal, or what historians conjectured.

(Dio, LIII, 19.)
NOTES

1. In our day, almost all those who condemned Charles I came to a tragic end. This is because such actions can scarcely be performed without making mortal enemies on all sides and thus without risking endless danger.
2. The Abbé de Saint-Real.
3. See Dio, LI (9).
4. There were no garrisons in the cities to restrain them, and the Romans had not needed to secure their empire by anything but armies or colonies.
5. This is quite obvious in the Letters of Cicero to Atticus.
6. Caesar made war on the Gauls, and Crassus on the Parthians, without any deliberation by the senate or decree by the people. See Dio (XXXVIII, 31; XL, 12).
7. I use this word here as it was used by the Greeks and Romans, who gave the name to everyone who had overthrown a democracy.
8. Only the triumphal ornaments were now given to individuals. Dio, Augustus (LIV, 24).
9. Since the Romans had changed their government without being invaded, their customs remained the same, and even the form of their government remained much the same.
10. Dio, Augustus, LIV (11, 24), says that Agrippa's modesty kept him from giving the senate an account of his expedition against the peoples of the Bosporus, that he even refused a triumph, and that no general triumphed thereafter. But this was a favor Augustus wanted to grant Agrippa and which Antony did not grant Ventidius the first time he conquered the Parthians.
12. Ibid. See the Institutes, I (5, 6).
15. See Tacitus, Annals, XIII (27): Late fuscum id corpus, etc. (The freedmen were a large and extensive body.)
16. He determined that the praetorian soldiers would receive five thousand drachmas: two thousand after sixteen years of service, and the other three after twenty years of service. Dio, Augustus (LV, 23).
17. See Tacitus, Annals, XIV (27), regarding the soldiers taken to Tarentum and Antium.